PWRRM February 2010

pwrrm@retaqs.com

9 participants
8 discussions

Use of Spreadsheets for Surveillances
by Gore, Duane 03 May '10

03 May '10

We at STP use spreadsheets to perform surveillance calculations. The results are then independently verified by a second engineer using an independently generated spreadsheet. Neither spreadsheet has been formally verified per our station Software Quality Assurance procedure. In cases where the results are used without further verification, we do properly QA the spreadsheets (usually in the cases where other groups use the spreadsheets). Our QA department is of the opinion that at least one of these spreadsheets used for surveillances must by fully verified and documented per our station Software Quality Assurance procedure. It would help my case if I could cite other Rae's practices with regards to the use of spreadsheets. What is the practice at your plant? Thank you, Duane Gore Supervisor, Reactor Engineering STPNOC (361) 972-8909

8 8

Electronic Benchmarking - Fuel Handling Issues
by WILLETT, JOSEPH E 15 Feb '10

15 Feb '10

We apologize for the lengthy list, but we're trying get the year started off right and wrap-up from a late fall outage. Fort Calhoun Station Reactor Engineering is looking to benchmark a few items 1) Do your stations fuel handling machines require fall protection? a. If yes, what measures are taken? Netting, harnesses, etc. b. If using netting, where is it attached? c. If using fall protection, where are the tie-offs? 2) What are you requirements for fuel movement in the Spent Fuel Pool? a. Continuous communications with Control Room? If yes, SRO, RO., Other. b. Do you require oversight on the spent fuel handling machine (SRO, RO, Other)? c. Is your procedure Continuous Use, Information Use or Reference Use? d. Do you utilize Vendors? If so, what additional oversight is required? 3) What type of underwater lights do you use for normal Spent Fuel Pool Lighting? a. Style: drop light or mounted b. Vendor: c. How many: d. Spacing: e. Ballasts: above water or submerged? 4) What type of underwater lights do you use for normal Reactor Cavity Lighting? a. Style: drop light or mounted b. Vendor: c. How many: d. Spacing: e. Ballasts: above water or submerged? 5) What type of underwater lights do you use for supplemental lighting? If Necessary. a. If so what would require the additional lighting? b. Style: drop light or mounted c. Vendor: d. How many: e. Spacing: f. Ballasts: above water or submerged? J. E. Willett ---------------------------------------------------- Joseph E. Willett, P.E. Principal Reactor Engineer-Fuel Nuclear Operations Division E-mail: jwillett(a)oppd.com<mailto:jwillett@oppd.com> Omaha Public Power District Phone: (402) 533-7213 Fort Calhoun Station Pager: (402) 561-3899 9610 Power Lane FAX: (402) 533-6747 Blair, NE 68008 Mail Station: FC-1-1 Plant ---------------------------------------------------- -------- This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use only by the intended recipient. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, nor acceptance. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

3 2

FW: FOR RELEASE: Questions to Reactor Engineering Community Regarding Cyber Security
by edward.mcvey＠exeloncorp.com 11 Feb '10

11 Feb '10

I thought I'd send this to the PWR folks as well. I believe we may have similar concerns on this issue. Ed McVey Exelon Nuclear Fuels ________________________________ From: McVey, Edward A.:(GenCo-Nuc) Sent: Thursday, February 11, 2010 12:29 PM To: rcrc(a)retaqs.com Cc: Tusar, James J:(GenCo-Nuc); Donell, Adam C.:(GenCo-Nuc); Spooner, Seth J.:(GenCo-Nuc); Hsiao, Ming-yuan:(GenCo-Nuc); Roger.thomas(a)pgnmail.com; Fisher, Jill T:(GenCo-Nuc) Subject: FW: FOR RELEASE: Questions to Reactor Engineering Community Regarding Cyber Security We discussed Cyber Security Issues at our last RCRC meeting. I'd appreciate responses to these questions. I know it's a long survey, but Exelon had our experts on the 3 vendors' Core Monitoring Systems put this together in order to help our fleet make a decision, and I would like to attempt to get the entire industry somewhat consistent on this as well. When we get responses accumulated, we'll send it out to everyone for your use. Thanks Ed McVey Questions to Reactor Engineering Community Regarding Cyber Security: Background: With the issuance of 10CFR73.54 and the associated Regulatory Guide (RG 5.71), NRC licensees are now required to provide high assurance that digital computer systems, communications, and networks are adequately protected against cyber attack. These documents require that the following systems be protected from such cyber attack: * Safety-related and important-to-safety functions * Security functions * Emergency preparedness functions * Support systems that if compromised could adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness The NRC has suggested the following cyber security defense architecture would be acceptable. (See Attached Picture) Where: * Level 4 would protect control and safety systems (e.g. digital feedwater systems) * Level 3 would protect data acquisition systems (e.g. plant process computer) * Level 2 would protect the site network * Level 1 would protect the greater corporate network * Level 0 would represent the internet In the NRC's defensive model, communication would not be permitted from less secure levels to the more secure levels for Levels 3 and 4. This issue could have considerable impact on the manner in which Reactor Engineers interact with the core monitoring systems. As such, your responses to the following questions would be greatly appreciated. Questions: 1. What safety classification (Safety Related, Non-Safety Related, Other) does your site consider its core monitoring system? 2. Does your site permit access to the core monitoring system from the following locations: * From non-corporate off-site locations (e.g. home)? * From corporate off-site locations (e.g. corporate headquarters)? * From on-site but outside of the control room or computer room? 3. If you have access to any of the locations in Question 2, what would be the impact to your organization if this was no longer permitted? 4. If you have access to any of the locations in Question 2 and this was removed, would any immediate or urgent actions be no longer possible for your Reactor Engineers in support of Operations? 5. Do you feel that the core monitoring system must be considered as a system that falls within any of the following? * Safety-related and important-to-safety functions * Security functions * Emergency preparedness functions * Support systems that if compromised could adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness 6. Has your organization considered locating the core monitoring system in Level 2? What is the basis of this decision? 7. Has your organization considered replicating the core monitoring system in Level 2 with a secure CMS in Level 3? Would you feel that predictions run in Level 2 would need to be repeated on the secure system? 8. Do you feel that a reactor engineering working group should be developed to address cyber security impacts on core monitoring systems? 9. Would you like to actively participate in such a working group? If so, please provide a contact name, phone number, and e-mail. ----------------------------------------- ************************************************** This e-mail and any of its attachments may contain Exelon Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Exelon Corporation family of Companies. This e-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this e-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this e-mail and any printout. Thank You. **************************************************

1 0

Measured power and uncertanties
by Adina K Lafrance 10 Feb '10

10 Feb '10

Surry is trying to answer a question this morning regarding power level indications and uncertainties. We are stating that within a certain confidence level, that the calorimetric calculation will produce a reactor power output (at RTP) from 98.8 to 101.2% with the rightly calibrated process instrumentation in the calorimetric program (App K). Half the time the operating power will be above 100%, half the time it will be below 100%. The opposing opinion is that if we have a 1.2% RTP uncertainty that we operate at or below 98.8% so as to not exceed RTP. The uncertainties in question relate to the plant computer-none of the redundant indications indicate higher than RTP (most notably delta Ts). It is also noted that we were told that no other site operates the way we are with regard to uncertainties. Can you please tell us how your site operates with regard to uncertainties and your RTP? Thank you in advance. Adina LaFrance The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them. -Albert Einstein Nuclear Analysis & Fuel Reactor Engineer Surry Power Station Email: Adina.K.LaFrance(a)Dom.com<mailto:Adina.K.LaFrance@Dom.com> Phone: 757-365-2658 Pager #: 4290 CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This electronic message contains information which may be legally confidential and or privileged and does not in any case represent a firm ENERGY COMMODITY bid or offer relating thereto which binds the sender without an additional express written confirmation to that effect. The information is intended solely for the individual or entity named above and access by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please reply immediately to the sender that you have received the message in error, and delete it. Thank you.

5 4

FW: Question on RxE Oral Boards
by Greer, C Dale 10 Feb '10

10 Feb '10

Qualification questionnaire. Sorry for the potential duplications... 1. Is there a requirement to have an oral board prior to becoming a QRxe? 2. If an oral board is required, is the oral board objective or subjective in nature? Sidebar: WBN and SQN are trying to implement a oral board qualification process for the final certification of PWR RxE's. Currently, we both have task oriented qualification cards. The intent of the final oral board is to verify that the QRxE candidate is well versed in the important RxE topics and able to work independently(and able to advise Operations in the control room). At WBN, the QRxE oral board was originally a remnant of STA qualification process (all RxE's were STA's in the Operations). The QRxE oral board was removed in 2005 due to training concerns that it was too subjective and could cause potential legal ramifications. 3. If an oral board is required, is there a monetary reward for passing the board or maintaining qualified status? 4. What happens when the QRxE candidate does not pass the oral board (is there formal remediation and eventually another oral board, can the QRxE candidate still be qualified as a RxE, etc.). Thanks in advance for your responses, C. Dale Greer TVA WBN RxE Manager Office :423-365-3834

7 7

Test5
by Tom Tomlinson 09 Feb '10

09 Feb '10

Testing of new mail list settings. Please disregard message. Tom Tomlinson

1 0

Re: [Pwrrm] PWRRM Digest, Vol 34, Issue 12
by Tom Tomlinson 04 Feb '10

04 Feb '10

Consistent with the intent of this guideline and the way BWRs are implementing it, this would be a SL3. The fact that the power reduction is automatic and by design is immaterial. The unplanned part is the loss of the initiating parameter, OAC in this case. If something causes an power change, the event is a SL3/SL4 depending on greater or less than 0.5%. The PWR REs really need a peer group like the BWRs' RCRC group to help each other with these kinds of questions. I have been hoping that either the PWROG or INPO would step up and form a group with that intent. Unfortunately that does not look like it will happen anytime soon. Does anyone else have an idea of how to accomplish this idea? Tom Tomlinson RETAQS -----Original Message----- From: pwrrm(a)retaqs.com [mailto:pwrrm@retaqs.com] On Behalf Of pwrrm-request(a)retaqs.com Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2010 12:00 PM To: pwrrm(a)retaqs.com Subject: PWRRM Digest, Vol 34, Issue 12 Send PWRRM mailing list submissions to pwrrm(a)retaqs.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://www.keffective.com/mailman/listinfo/pwrrm or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to pwrrm-request(a)retaqs.com You can reach the person managing the list at pwrrm-owner(a)retaqs.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of PWRRM digest..." Today's Topics: 1. PWR RM PI Significance Level for "Designed Runbacks" (Sanders, Gene Jr) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 14:49:17 -0500 From: "Sanders, Gene Jr" <Gene.Sanders(a)duke-energy.com> Subject: [Pwrrm] PWR RM PI Significance Level for "Designed Runbacks" To: "pwrrm(a)retaqs.com" <pwrrm(a)retaqs.com> Message-ID: <22A8474FC8468A439A927EF628FED52B159F2D349F(a)IMCLUSEXCP55.nam.ent.duke-energy .com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ref.: PWR RM PI document, Rev.1 (Draft 8-10-09) Attach. 3, "Significance Level 3 Event Examples", ex. 3.9 and Attach. 4, "Significance Level 4 Event Examples", ex. 4.6. 3.9 Unplanned Reactivity Change Caused by Equipment Problem or Personnel Error Reactor Power Change > 0.5% RTP When >5% RTP Reactivity Change > x pcm When < 5% RTP 4.9 Unplanned Reactivity Change Caused by Equipment Problem or Personnel Error Reactor Power Change < 0.5% RTP When >5% RTP Reactivity Change < x pcm When < 5% RTP Are the above examples to be applied to "Design Runbacks"? Even though a plant runback was/is incorporated into a given plant's control design, are these occurrences to be considered an "Unplanned Reactivity Change / Reactor Power Change"? For example, at Oconee, a loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) Core Thermal Power (CTP) Signal to the Integrated Control System (ICS) will cause the ICS to control the plant to a CTP calculated by the ICS, which typically results in a real power reduction, "by design", of ~0.75% RTP. If this occurrence / scenario is considered to be "Unplanned", then a "Significance Level 3 Event" appears to be required, even though the significance of such an Event pales in comparison to other Level 3 Event Examples. Is this what was / is intended for design runbacks? Thanks in advance for your response, T E (Gene) Sanders ONS Rx Engineering 864.873.3377

1 0

Re: [Pwrrm] PWRRM Digest, Vol 34, Issue 12
by Tom Tomlinson 03 Feb '10

03 Feb '10

1 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

PWRRM February 2010